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Abstract 
 
In this paper we investigate the interdependence of the sovereign default risk and banking 
system fragility in two major emerging markets, China and Russia, using credit default swaps 
as a proxy for default risk. Both countries’ banking industries have strong ties with their 
governments and public sector, even after a series of significant reforms in the last two 
decades. Our analysis is built on the case studies of each country’s two biggest banks. We 
employ bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error correction (VECM) 
framework to analyse the short- and long-run dynamics of the chosen CDS prices. We use 
Granger causality to describe the direction of the discovered dynamics. We find evidence of a 
stable long-run relationship between sovereign and bank CDS spreads in the chosen time 
period. The more stable relationship is found in cases, where biggest state-owned universal 
banks in emerging markets are closely managed by the government. But the fragility of those 
banks does not directly affect the state of public finance. However, in cases, where state-
owned banks directly participate in large governmental projects, the banking fragility may 
result in deteriorations of state funds, while raising the risk of sovereign default.  
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1. Introduction 
 
During the recent financial crisis, which started in the US and has quickly spread to Europe 
and the rest of the World, extraordinary measures were taken by central banks and 
governments to prevent a collapse of the financial sector. Support packages from governments 
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and monetary authorities during the global financial crisis have reached unprecedented levels, 
resulting in severe deteriorations of public finance. These actions combined with the cyclical 
deterioration of fiscal positions and discretionary fiscal expansions have led to a substantial 
pick up in debt to GDP ratios in many countries (Tagkalakis, 2014). Moreover, certain effects 
of taking such measures on the interdependence of the financial and sovereign sectors were 
unknown or even neglected until the followed Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  
If the concern about the connectivity between sovereign default risk and bank fragility 
started to grow in developed countries only after the crisis, the same connectivity is 
historically presumed for developing countries, where the biggest banks are mainly state-
owned and largely participate in state-initiated investment projects. At the same time, since 
main channels through which sovereign risk can have an impact on financial institutions (such 
as asset holding channel and collateral channel) are significantly smaller in developing 
countries than in European countries due to significantly lower public debt, the two-way 
nexus problem does not seem to be that apparent and straightforward anymore.  
In the literature, the sovereign/bank dependence was addressed only for the biggest 
European economies, but should definitely be considered for a larger group of countries to 
collect broader systematic evidence. In this paper, we are aimed to analyse the sovereign 
default – bank fragility nexus on the world’s biggest emerging markets – China and Russia. 
We assume that the increase/decrease in Chinese and Russian sovereign default risk should 
cause the change in the default risk of domestic banks in the same direction and vice versa. 
However, the intensity of this direct linkage changes over time with effects of seemingly 
successful “survival” of the global financial crisis, followed by the domestic credit expansion 
with higher risks to facilitate higher rates of economic growth. We generally consider that the 
possible problems of growing housing bubble and non-performing loans in China and 
political risks and economic instability in Russia can easily affect the stability of the banking 
system and, consequently, increase the sovereign default risk, even when the government debt 
remains comparatively low.  
Our study contributes to, at least, two strands of literature. First, it supplements the 
literature that investigates the interconnectivity between sovereign default risk and bank 
stability and its development during financial crisis. Second, it is linked to the literature 
addressing government’s role in state-owned banks and its effects on the banking sector. 
Tied to the first strand of literature, the mutual jeopardy of sovereign default risk and 
banking system fragility has been proven valid in various empirical studies, such as 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Ejsing and Lemke (2011), Dieckmann and Plank 
(2011), Alter and Schüler (2012) and Bruyckere et al. (2013), which are mostly based on 
European data and usually focus on one direction of the studied risk transfer. Direct 
interconnectedness of balance sheets of governments and banks and financial market reactions 
to the announcements or implementations of government bailout and other state guarantee 
programs are the main methods to analyse the two-way interaction between the banking and 
public sectors. Among other interesting approaches to analyse this problem, König et al. 
(2014) employ a global-game approach to show the importance of balance sheet transparency 
when trying to use bank debt guarantees as a costless measure to prevent unwilling bank runs. 
Unfortunately, required balance sheet transparency is definitely not present in emerging 
markets, making the problem of moral hazard significantly higher than in developed 
countries.  
Within the second strand of literature, the importance and performance of state-owned 
banks is a long-lasting debate. Both theoretical and empirical literature in developing 
countries suggests a negative impact of state ownership on bank performance (Bonin et al., 
2005; Jiang et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2013), which is more significant on profit efficient 
rather than on cost efficient side. Cornett et al. (2010) finds that state-owned banks operate 
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less proﬁtably, hold less core capital, and had greater credit risk than privately owned banks. 
Contrary to such findings, Shen et al. (2013) found that unless government-owned banks are 
required to purchase a distressed bank due to some political factors, their performances are at 
par with that of private banks. Extensive research of the phenomena on the Brazilian banking 
system suggests that state banks are able to outperform both foreign and private domestic 
banks (Tecles and Tabak, 2010), but the governmental control over banks also leads to 
significant political influence over the real decisions of funded firms (Carvalho, 2014). On 
average, the efficiency advantages of foreign banks compared with domestic banks tend to 
outweigh the possible disadvantages in many developing and transitory countries (Berger, 
2007).  
We add to existing literature by quantifying the relationship of the interdependence of 
the sovereign default risk and its domestic banks in emerging markets on the example of 
China and Russia as one of the world’s most expanding economies. Methodologically, we 
show the direction of the relationship proving great interconnectedness of Chinese and 
Russian government and their domestic banking sector. We show that sovereign default risk 
defines state-owned bank fragility in emerging markets and that state-owned banks could 
have a significant impact on the sustainability of public finance. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the feedback loops 
between government activity and financial stability. Section 3 discusses the problems in 
public finance and banking system of the studied countries. Section 4 presents data and 
methodology. In Section 4 discuses the main results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Sovereign - banks contagion channels in emerging markets 
 
Given the historical evidences from developing countries of sovereign distresses leading to 
financial tensions and banking crises resulting in sovereign defaults, it is of great importance 
to better understand the feedback loops between government activities and overall financial 
stability. Risk transmission between banks and sovereigns can arise from several important 
sources: (1) bank holdings of possibly risky sovereign debt, (2) explicit and implicit state 
guarantees to banks, and (3) spillovers from sovereign spreads into bank borrowing costs. The 
risk sources institute four main channels of contagion, through which deterioration in the 
state’s creditworthiness can potentially affects banking system stability and vice versa (BIS, 
2011). Let’s consider these four contagion channels in the studied emerging markets: 
− asset holding channel; 
− collateral channel; 
− rating channel; 
− guarantee channel. 
First, increases in sovereign risk may affect banks through their direct holding of 
sovereign debt. Any loose on banks’ portfolios weaken banks’ balance sheets and increases 
the risk of default at the same time. If securities are denominated at a market value, any fall in 
prices would have a direct impact on banks’ profits, equity and leverage. Holdings of 
domestic government bonds as a percentage of bank capital tend to be larger in countries with 
high public debt. In advanced economies, banks often have sizeable exposures to the home 
sovereign and generally have a strong home bias in their sovereign portfolios. Banks can also 
hold some amount of foreign country debt. Financial markets are broadly aware of the risk 
arising from foreign claims as countries that held a large claim in Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain experienced their CDS premium to co-move close to CDS premium of those 
countries (Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). Banks also participate in over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives markets, where governments participate to adjust the interest rate or currency 
composition of their outstanding debt. On the other direction of asset holding channel, bank 
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fragility increases when bank directly follows owner’s requirements and is ought to invest in 
government projects, such as infrastructure projects, profitability of which is usually highly 
questionable.  
 
Table 1. Investor Base for General Government Debt in the Studied Countries, end-2012 
 
Holders of Government Debt China Russia 
Domestic central bank 10% 4% 
Domestic bank 89% 36% 
Domestic nonbank Not significant 42% 
Foreign official sector Not significant 1% 
Foreign nonbank Not significant 13% 
Foreign bank Not significant 4% 
 
Source: Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014) 
Note: Government debt indicates general government gross debt. Domestic banks are depository 
corporations residing in the country (IFS definition). Foreign banks are BIS reporting banks and bank 
branches residing outside the country. Foreign official sector includes foreign official loans and 
foreign central bank holdings as reserve assets. Foreign nonbanks and domestic nonbanks are imputed 
from external and total debt. 
 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the estimated holdings of the government debt in the 
studied emerging markets at the end of 2012. It is clearly evident that banks are the key 
holders of domestic government bonds in both Russia and China, which they typically hold to 
its maturity. In China banks are almost the sole investor in government bonds with their 
unchanged position during the last few post-crisis years, while in Russia the investor base is 
much more diversified. Given the state ownership of major bank, this contagion channel is 
evidently very important for both countries in both directions. Moreover, since the secondary 
corporate bond market in both countries is underdeveloped, the authorities determine the risk-
free cost of capital in the sovereign bond market. In the primary market, the bond prices are 
set below the clearing level of demand and supply and they are priced off the regulated one-
year deposit rate. As the secondary market is very thin, the banks are guaranteed a return and 
the central government can use them to finance its fiscal expansion.  
Second channel implies contagion when there is a reduction in the value of the 
collateral that banks can use to obtain wholesale funding and central bank refinancing. 
Sovereign securities are used by banks as collateral to secure wholesale funding from central 
banks, private repo markets and issuance of covered bonds, and to back OTC derivative 
positions. When the price of sovereign bond falls, the value of the collateral automatically 
falls as well. Central banks often use government bonds as collateral in provision of their 
liquidity transactions which are typically conducted through repurchase agreements or 
secured transactions. Another market which is very sensitive to risk perception is private repo 
market. And last, sovereign debt is widely used as collateral in covered bonds issuances.  
In both studied countries, the repo market is largely used. In China’s OTC market, 
according to Asian Development Bank (2012), covered bond collateral repo accounts for over 
97% of total repo market in terms of trading volume with the most actively traded repos being 
in the 1-day and 7-day categories, which account for over 90% of repo transactions. Policy 
bank bonds, central bank paper, medium-term notes and government bonds are the four most 
traded repos in the interbank bond market. In Russia, almost half of the collateral in their repo 
market were corporate bonds, followed by 30% government bonds and 22% stocks (NSMA, 
2010). 
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Contagion through rating channel happens when downgrade in country rating also 
translates to home country banks. It has direct negative effect on the cost of banks’ debt and 
equity funding. Sovereign rating often represents a ceiling for the rating of domestic banks. 
Even considering the critic against rating agencies practices, ratings of emerging markets are 
one of the main criteria for global investors. Williams et al. (2013) analyse the effects of 
sovereign rating changes on the credit ratings of their domestic banks in detail. They found 
that sovereign rating upgrades (downgrades) have strong effects on bank rating upgrades 
(downgrades). Interestingly enough, the emerging market bank ratings were less likely to 
follow sovereign rating downgrades during the recent financial crisis period. 
As the final channel of contagion, bank fragility increases, when the government faces 
difficulties and has little chance to provide guarantees for a bank in trouble. Especially after 
the Lehman Brothers collapse, the US and European governments started to provide explicit 
guarantees for banks in order to prevent a failure. However, the worsening of sovereign fiscal 
position in the Eurozone reduced the value of both implicit and explicit guarantees. When a 
financial institution faces liquidity issues of any sort, it may cause a contagion process 
affecting public sector. Sovereign default risk significantly rises when state might intervene to 
prevent bank bankruptcy. In emerging markets, this contagion channel is also particularly 
important, given the state ownership of biggest banks, which insures the stability of domestic 
banking sector, but also raises banks’ level of moral hazard.  
To summarize, it is this particular private-to-public risk transfer that adjusts the 
probability of sovereign default, on one hand, and lowers the default risk of financial 
institutions, on the other. The main consequence of the risk transfer from the private sector to 
sovereign treasuries has been an increased interdependence of banks and countries, causing 
negative feedback loops between their financial conditions. Acharya et al. (2011) model this 
feedback mechanism in detail. 
The two-way interaction between banks and public sector is closely related to the 
liquidity problem. Uncertainty following sovereign distress induces a run on banks’ deposits 
or a collapse of the interbank market and, as a result, pushes banks to reduce lending. 
Cantero-Saiz et al. (2014) analyse how sovereign risk influences the loan supply reaction of 
banks to monetary policy. They confirmed that sovereign risk plays an important role in 
determining loan supply from banks, however the evidence was significant only for monetary 
restriction regimes and not for expansions. As a solution to the studied problématique, Paries 
et al. (2013) show that central bank liquidity policy (through full allotment policy) has a 
potential to be successful in stabilizing the spiralling feedback loops. 
 
3. Problems in public finance and banking sectors of China and Russia 
 
Since we established that the contagion of default risks can run in both directions, the events 
in main risk transfer channels can be triggered in times of sovereign distress or systemic 
banking crisis (Acharya et al. 2011, Gray, 2009 and IMF, 2010). 
 The probability of sovereign distress in the studied countries is smaller than in many 
developed countries, but should be considered unstable. China sustained the global financial 
crisis better than most countries due to a large government stimulus program. This stimulus, 
however, was mainly in the form of off-budget infrastructure spending and thus not visible in 
the headline fiscal data. Zhang and Barnett (2014) analyse the augmented fiscal deficit and 
debt in China finding out that both are considerably higher than the headline government data 
suggest.  
In recent history, Russia already went through a sovereign default crisis. In Moody’s 
Report (2009) in-depth case study of Russian financial system during the 1998 crisis, still 
relevant country-specific institutional and political factors have a great influence on the 
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magnitude of sovereign crisis spillovers into the corporate sector. The Russian public debt 
level is extremely dependent on oil prices, as proven by Danilova (2012). This is a threat to 
the stability of government securities market which remains exposed to the financial markets 
conditions. Arakelyan and Nestmann (2011), while addressing the issue of high corporate and 
bank debt in Russia, highlight the fact that the government owns a large part of corporate and 
bank assets. State support to Russian quasi sovereigns has also increased liabilities of the 
Russian federal government. At the same time, current debt policy of Russia is seemingly 
aimed at upgrading of Russia’s credit ratings and ensuring its solvency.  
Recent studies indicate that currently the biggest threat to banking system stability in 
China is shadow banking. According to the Financial Stability Board report (2013), the 
growth of shadow banking in China was 42% in 2012. Li and Hsu (2013) examine China’s 
shadow banking in detail and identify potential risk of liquidity shortage and bankruptcy risk. 
Thomson Reuters (2014) research of the shadow banking in China points out the risk of the 
shadow banking bubble, endangering China’s financial system stability as a whole. 
Economists are also concerned about continuous slowdown of Chinese economic growth and 
the fact that Chinese government in its war against non-performing loans had caused the 
growth of default risk (because of government’s direct lending to troubled banks with high 
NPL ratio). Even if official statistics tells the story of low NPL ratios (Table 2), it is hard to 
deduce if the non-performing loan problem was successfully resolved or just professionally 
hidden. Moreover, since the government still plays a predominant role in bank lending 
policies and still aimed to accommodate higher rates of economic growth resulting in growing 
bubble in the construction sector and housing market, the problem of non-performing loans 
may suddenly reappear. 
 
Table 2. Non-performing Loans in China and Russia, % of total gross loans 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
China 22,4 29,8 26 20,4 14,2 8,6 7,1 6,2 2,4 1,6 1,1 1 1 1 
Russia 7,7 6,2 5,6 5 4,1 3,6 2,4 2,5 3,8 9,5 8,2 6,6 6 6 
 
Source: WorldBank, 2013 
 
In Russia, on the other hand, non-performing loans problem also tends to be 
underestimated due to non-compatible NPL definition used by the Central Bank of Russia 
(Table 2). At the same time, the Russian banking system is heavily regulated, which 
significantly reduces the competition in the banking market. According to Anzoategui et al. 
(2010), the banking system remains the least competitive among BRIC countries, even though 
it includes more than thousand commercial banks. Within Russia, large state-owned banks 
exert more market power than the smaller and privately owned institutions.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
 
Due to limited availability of information to formulate direct numerical representation of 
contagion channels, we consider credit default swap prices as a proxy of credit default risk. 
To describe it briefly, the CDS is a derivatives contract that hedges the default risk of an 
underlying state or company that it references by transferring it to a third party on a bilateral 
basis. Traditionally, CDS spreads represent the fair insurance price for the credit risk of a 
company or sovereign default risk of a state, and have been used as an indicator to measure 
the counterparty risk. Ammer and Cai (2007) examine the relationships between credit default 
swap (CDS) premiums and bond yield spreads for nine emerging market sovereign borrowers. 
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They found no equilibrium in the short-run but significant long-turn relationship. Therefore, 
CDS spreads represent long-term risks in emerging markets alongside with short-term 
adjustments to market risks.  
To study the nexus between sovereign default risk and bank fragility in emerging 
markets, we consider five-year credit default swaps for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
and Russian Federation to represent sovereign default probabilities and credit default swaps 
for two big banks in each country to represent “too-big-to-fail” part of the banking system and 
its probability of default. We include four banks (Table 3) in our study, for which extensive 
CDS data are available: 
− Bank of China – one of the China’s Big Four banks, the second biggest lender in the 
country; 
− China Development Bank – one of the three China’s policy banks, responsible for 
raising funding for large infrastructure projects; 
− Sberbank - the largest bank in Russia and Eastern Europe and the third largest in 
Europe; 
− VTB bank – one of the leading universal banks in Russia, especially in financing 
government investment activities, such as Sochi Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup. 
The data are collected from Bloomberg. Bloomberg reports CMA data, which 
compiles prices quoted by dealers in the privately negotiated market. We have chosen five-
year spreads as the benchmark since they are generally considered the most liquidly traded 
and therefore offer more accurate barometer of risk appetite. The sample data consists of 
weekly prices from January 24th, 2003 till April 25th, 2014 for sovereign CDS; the time 
range of bank CDS is given in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Basic Characteristics of Studied Banks, end-2013 
 
Bank Ownership 
Total Assets  
(bil. US dollars) 
Market Share  
(% of country’s total 
banking assets) 
CDS data availability 
Bank of China State 2229,95 9,58 January 2003 – October 2011 
China Develop-
ment Bank  
State 1206,69 5,11 
January 2005 – December 2006, 
October 2007 –April 2014 
Sberbank State 486,40 28,6 October 2009 – March 2014 
VTB State/Private 262,05 15,41 August 2005 – March 2014 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Figure 1 describes data in levels. Casual observation of levels implies that each CDS 
series appears to be non-stationary and that CDS spreads in each country tend to move 
together over time without a trend. The differences of chosen variables seem to vary over a 
constant level of zero, although there are few large outliers, which should be accounted for in 
the model. From the inspection of properties of data seen in first differences (not reported 
here due to space constraints, but available on request), it is indicated that the assumption of 
multivariate normality might be accepted with minor changes of the model in order to obtain 
better specification and robustness of further analysis. 
There are two approaches to analyse the sovereign/bank dependence: direct 
(contingent claim analysis) and indirect (through financial market reactions). Bank-by-bank 
framework of contingent claims analysis uses balance sheet data plus high-frequency market 
data in a way that measures risk exposures and can capture key risk transmission and 
feedbacks with the sovereign in real time (Gray and Malone, 2012). Contingent claim analysis 
represents a generalization of the option-pricing theory and, thus, is forward-looking by 
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construction, providing a consistent framework based on current market conditions rather than 
on purely historical experience. Indirect approach usually accounts for interdependencies 
between sovereign and bank CDS spreads with the apparatus of financial econometrics (such 
as Alter and Schüler, 2012 or Alter and Beyer, 2014).  
 
Figure 1. Level series of studied government and bank CDS 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
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To analyse the dynamics of the long- and short-run interdependencies between 
selected CDS price series, we employ bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error 
correction (VECM) framework. Such framework allows for testing and interpreting 
cointegration relation between studied series. To further illustrate the entire dynamics 
between the CDS spreads and describe the direction of the discovered dynamics, we consider 
Granger causality tests. The study employs cointegration analysis and follows theoretical 
formations and research design suggestions described in Johansen (1996) and Juselius (2006). 
Cointegrated VAR analysis should be employed with great caution, since several 
conditions have to be met to achieve trustworthy and credible results. Following Granger 
(1986) and Engle and Granger (1987), variables are called cointegrated if they have a 
common stochastic trend. To check the stochastic non-stationarity of the data the unit root is 
required. We conduct standard Augment Dickey-Fuller (1981) unit root test (ADF), which 
constructs a parametric correction for higher-order correlation by assuming that the 𝑦𝑡 time 
series follows an AR(p) process with p lagged difference terms and both with and without 
constant 𝛼0: 
 
∆𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑡 = α0 + γ𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽1∆𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑝∆𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡, where 𝛾 = −(1 − ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 )      (1) 
 
Alternatively, we use non-parametric Phillips-Perron (PP) test relaxing the ADF test 
assumption of identically distributed errors. The test is robust with respect to unspecified 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the disturbance process of the test equation (1). The 
parameter of interest in both regressions is 𝛾 (if 𝛾 = 0, the series contain unit root). The result 
of the t-test is compared to appropriate critical values. 
We employ both Engle-Granger and Johansen procedures to find the common trend in 
the bivariate time series, which is based on the vector autoregressive (VAR) model of the 
form: 
 
(
𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑡
𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡
) = 𝛱1 (
𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑡−1
𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡−1
) + 𝛱𝑝 (
𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑡−𝑝
𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡−𝑝
) + 𝜇0 + 𝜙𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡,                       (2) 
 
The deterministic components might include a vector of constant terms, 𝜇0, and 𝐷𝑡 
contains impulse dummy variables explaining extraordinary effects. The lag p is determined 
by several criteria: sequential modified LR test statistic, Final prediction error, Akaike, 
Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria. 
In the Engle-Granger two step method two time series are cointegrated, when the 
linear combination of them is stationary. Johansen cointegration technique is based on two 
test statistics to determine the number of cointegrating vectors (the rank of the matrix) namely 
the trace statistic and the maximum eigenvalue statistic, which are computed for the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration as: 
𝐿𝑅𝑡𝑟(𝑟|𝑘) = −𝑇 ∑ log (1 − 𝜆𝑖),
𝑘
𝑖=𝑟+1
                                                                                         (3) 
𝐿𝑅𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑟|𝑟 + 1) = −𝑇 log(1 − 𝜆𝑖) = 𝐿𝑅𝑡𝑟(𝑟|𝑘) − 𝐿𝑅𝑡𝑟(𝑟 + 1|𝑘)                                       (4) 
 
Trace statistic tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating relations against the 
alternative of k cointegrating relations, where k is the number of variables in the system for r 
=0,1,2…k-1. The maximum eigenvalue statistics tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating 
relations against the alternative of r+1 cointegrating relations for r =0,1,2…k-1. The null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected, if the rank of the coefficient matrix is at least 1.  
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The third step of our investigation is based on Granger Representation Theorem. If the 
variables in the VAR model, which represents the long-run dynamics between indices, are 
found to be cointegrated, when there must exist an associated error-correction model, which 
can be built by imposing the number of cointegration relations previously identified as 
restrictions: 
 
(
∆𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑡
∆𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡
) = 𝛱 (
𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑡−1
𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡−1
) + 𝛤1 (
∆𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑠𝑜𝑣𝑡−𝑝
∆𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡−𝑝
) + 𝜀𝑡,                                          (5) 
 
where 𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑗,𝑡, with 𝑗 ∈  {𝑠𝑜𝑣, 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘} refers to log 𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑗,𝑡, i.e. the logarithmized CDS series of 
the country or bank. ∆𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑗,𝑡 denotes the difference between 𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑗,𝑡 a 𝑐𝑑𝑠𝑗,𝑡−1. 𝛱 =
( 𝛼𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝛼𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
) (𝛽𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑔𝑜𝑣 𝛽𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘) represents long-run changes of the system and 𝛤1 denotes 
transitory adjustments with 𝛾-coefficients potraying the short-run dynamics. Note that 𝛽𝑠𝑜𝑣 is 
normalized and only 𝛽𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 is estimated. The loading coefficient 𝛼 measure the speed of 
adjustment with which a particular CDS would adjust to the long-run relationship. 
As the last step, we employ Granger causality test to identify the causality sense 
between CDS series (causality implies a chronological ordering of movements of the series). 
If we denote the first analysed series (its first differences) as 𝐼1,𝑡 and the second series as 𝐼2,𝑡 
the Granger causality model takes the following form: 
∆𝐼1,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1
∆𝐼1,𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑞
𝑗=1
∆𝐼2,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                      (6) 
 
Wald’s test for joint significance of the parameters 𝛽𝑗 is performed to evaluate the null 
hypothesis that 𝐼1,𝑡 does not Granger cause 𝐼2,𝑡. 
 
Table 4. Results of ADF and PP tests 
 
 
Test China 
Bank of 
China 
CDBC Russia Sberbank VTB 
le
v
el
s 
ADF (with 
intercept) 
-1.599 -0.445 -1.030 -1.725 -2.373 -1.396 
ADF (with trend 
and intercept) 
-2.833 -1.939 -1.184 -2.379 -2519 -1.576 
PP (with intercept) -1.574 -0.776 -1.192 -1.854 -2.414 -1.538 
PP (with trend and 
intercept) 
-2.813 -2.159 -1.469 -2.494 -2.607 -1.760 
fi
rs
t 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s ADF (with 
intercept) 
-25.571 -20.191 -20.592 -22.109 -14.331 -20.019 
ADF (with trend 
and intercept) 
-25.581 -20.246 -20.581 -22.120 -14.310 -19.996 
PP (with intercept) -25.511 -20.489 -20.731 -22.132 -14.378 -20.095 
PP (with trend and 
intercept) 
-25.523 -20.516 -20.718 -22.140 -14.356 -20.072 
 
Note: MacKinnon critical values are 3.4443 and -2.8676 for 1% and 5% level of significance 
respectively 
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5. Results and Discussion 
 
The logarithms of the chosen CDS series are tested for unit roots using the Augment Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. The p-values used in the test are MacKinnon 
one-sided p-values. Several ADF test are calculated in levels and in the first differences with 
inclusion of constant or constant and trend (Table 4). The results of the ADF unit root test 
show that at logarithm levels all CDS prices are non-stationary series with a deterministic 
trend. However, the ADF tests performed at first differences suggest that data are stationary, 
hence all variables are first-order integrated series or I(1). 
Having confirmed that studied CDS spreads can be characterized as integrated series 
with order one, we first examine the long-run relations among selected pairs of CDS prices. 
Vector Autoregressive model of series pairs indicate the appropriate lag order, which is 
selected by three criteria: LR test statistic, Schwarz Information Criterion and Hannan-Quinn 
Information Criterion (Table 5). For all of time series pairs, the lag order of two is chosen. 
 
Table 5. Lag length determination 
 
Lag AIC SC HQ 
China – Bank of China 
0 1.904536 1.922799 1.911734 
1 -4.406774 -4.351984 -4.385180 
2 -4.451943 -4.360627* -4.415952* 
3 -4.453224 -4.325381 -4.402836 
4 -4.454685* -4.290315 -4.389900 
China – China Development Bank 
0  1.370655  1.393376  1.379713 
1 -3.873735 -3.805573 -3.846564 
2 -4.004933  -3.891328*  -3.959647* 
3  -4.008726* -3.849680 -3.945326 
Russia - Sberbank 
0 -3.243347 -3.211256 -3.230371 
1 -5.746662 -5.650387 -5.707734 
2 -5.864491  -5.704032*  -5.799609* 
3 -5.855758 -5.631116 -5.764925 
4  -5.875988* -5.587163 -5.759202 
Russia – VTB 
0  1.272725  1.292645  1.280613 
1 -4.621356 -4.561596 -4.597693 
2 -4.696315  -4.596715*  -4.656876* 
3 -4.702317 -4.562877 -4.647103 
4 -4.690424 -4.511144 -4.619434 
5  -4.710318* -4.491198 -4.623552 
Note: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
 
The residual analysis is conducted to determine whether chosen model specification is 
statistically well-specified, or in other words, to check the assumption of the error terms being 
independently normally distributed (results are summarized in Table 6). It is worth 
mentioning that valid statistical inference is sensitive to violation of certain assumptions, such 
as autocorrelated or skewed residuals and parameter inconstancy, and robust to violation of 
others, such as residual heteroskedasticity or excess kurtosis. 
The better specified model includes several dummies, allowing for further application 
of the proposed methodology. Model dummies signify three substantial events on the Chinese 
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and Russian banking markets. All dummy variables are substantial at 9% significance level 
(later discussed in Table 8). For example, for the pair Chinese sovereign – Bank of China 
CDS, dummies are found to highlight and explain important changes in the Chinese banking 
system. First dummy (April 2003) corresponds to Chinese government extra-ordinary 
measures to resolve the issue of bank non-performing loans. Up to the end of 2003 the four 
major financial asset management corporations had disposed of 301.4 billion yuan of NPLs 
excluding the conversion of liabilities to equities, recovering 101.3 billion yuan including 
67.5 billion yuan of cash (Ye, 2003). Second dummy (November 2007) relates to the sudden 
effects of the global financial crisis on Chinese financial markets through diminishing 
liquidity on the interbank market. As a result, Chinese stock indexes lose over 60% between 
November 2007 and September 2008. Third dummy (October 2008) illustrates China’s 
central bank measures on handling domestic economic slowdown (growth of the Chinese 
economy fell to 6,8% in the fourth quarter of 2008 from 13% in 2007). China's central bank 
cut both interest rate and reserve requirements and released 4 trillion yuan special stimulus 
package in an effort to boost domestic economy and avoid deflation.  
 
Table 6. Multivariate misspecification tests 
 
Test Model without dummies Model with dummies 
China – Bank of China 
Residual autocorrelation LM(1) 𝜒2(4) =6.5868 [0.159]  𝜒2(4) =26.506 [0.000] 
Residual autocorrelation LM(2)  𝜒2(4) =5.4125 [0.247]  𝜒2(4) =13.249 [0.011] 
Test for normality (skewness) 𝜒2(2) =50.900 [0.000]  𝜒2(2) =3.3666 [0.186] 
Test for normality (kurtosis) 𝜒2(2) =1133.3 [0.000]  𝜒2(2) =209.09 [0.000] 
China –China Development Bank   
Residual autocorrelation LM(1) 𝜒2(4) =12.437 [0.014]  𝜒2(4) =22.411 [0.000] 
Residual autocorrelation LM(2)  𝜒2(4) =10.927 [0.027]  𝜒2(4) =9.6214 [0.047] 
Test for normality (skewness) 𝜒2(2) =77.418 [0.000]  𝜒2(2) =3.2911 [0.193] 
Test for normality (kurtosis) 𝜒2(2) =2258.7 [0.000]  𝜒2(2) =294.84 [0.000] 
Russia – Sberbank 
Residual autocorrelation LM(1) 𝜒2(4) =15.179 [0.004]  𝜒2(4) =16.447 [0.002]  
Residual autocorrelation LM(2)  𝜒2(4) =19.184 [0.001]  𝜒2(4) =13.669 [0.008]  
Test for normality (skewness) 𝜒2(2) =25.722 [0.000]  𝜒2(2) =3.3454 [0.187]  
Test for normality (kurtosis) 𝜒2(2) =92.693 [0.000]  𝜒2(2) =15.232 [0.000]  
Russia - VTB 
Residual autocorrelation LM(1) 𝜒2(4) =10.429 [0.034]  𝜒2(4) =14.138 [0.002]  
Residual autocorrelation LM(2)  𝜒2(4) =10.396 [0.034]  𝜒2(4) =10.614 [0.082]  
Test for normality (skewness) 𝜒2(2) =167.31 [0.000]  𝜒2(2) =0.7490 [0.687]  
Test for normality (kurtosis) 𝜒2(2) =2578.3 [0.000]  𝜒2(2) =113.28 [0.000]  
Note: p-values are denoted in brackets 
 
For the pair Russian sovereign – VTB CDS, dummies are found to highlight and 
explain important changes in the Russian banking system. First dummy (October 2005) 
corresponds to Russian government extra-ordinary measures to finance VTB’s acquisition of 
Moscow Narodny and other former Soviet foreign trade banks from the Central Bank of 
Russia. The Russian government approved a capital increase of 37.5 billion rubles in state-
owned VTB. Second dummy (July 2007) relates to the sudden takeover of Slavneftebank in 
Belarus, later renamed VTB Belarus. VTB was the first Russian bank to offer an initial public 
offering (IPO), raising $8 billion in what became the largest international banking IPO at the 
time. Third dummy (August 2008) illustrates the RTS Index fall down by 6,5% as a reaction 
to the conflict in Georgia. This fact provides ample evidence of how nervous international 
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markets reacted during these turbulent times. Following these events the devaluation pressure 
on the ruble increased. Up to this point, Russian banks had not yet experienced liquidity 
shortages. 
For the model including dummies, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no first or 
second order autocorrelation, while model residuals are found to be normally skewed. Now 
we can assume the robustness of results of cointegration tests. The Engle-Granger 
cointegration test requires individual variables to be non-stationary, which was established 
previously (Table 1). Significant coefficients of the individual variables in the cointegrating 
regression (Table 8) alongside with stationary residuals from the cointegrating regression 
indicate strong cointegration of studied CDS series. Johansen test of rank determination also 
signals the existence of cointegration. Both trace test and maximum eigenvalue test suggests 
the cointegration rank of the model to equal one (Table 7).  
The results of the error-correction model specification are summarized in Table 8. The 
𝛼-coefficients in the cointegration relations indicate the adjustments of default risks to long-
term equilibrium between them. The adjustment of both sovereign and bank CDS spreads are 
found for China Development Bank and VTB bank. It means that the relationship between 
bank fragility and sovereign default risk is not stable over time with frequent adjustments. 
The 𝛼-coefficients in the relations of Chinese state and Bank of China suggests that the bank 
spread do not adjust to any deviations from the long-run equilibrium, while the sovereign 
CDS adjusts at a rate of 𝛼𝑐𝑑𝑠_𝑔𝑜𝑣 = −0,06 to changes in the Bank of China spreads. At the 
same time, model results signify that bank risks adjust to short-term dynamics of sovereign 
CDS spreads. The most stable relationship is found for the pair Russian Federation – 
Sberbank, where no short-term adjustments or short-term dynamics is discovered. 
 
Table 7. Rank Determination (results of Johansen cointegration test) 
 
Test 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative 
hypothesis 
Eigenvalue Test statistic 
5% critical 
value 
p-value 
 China – Bank of China 
Trace 
r=0 r>0 0.0393 18.415 12.321 0.0042 
r≤1 r>1 0.0004 0.1657 4.1299 0.7363 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
r=0 r=1 0.0393 18.249 11.225 0.0025 
r=1 r=2 0.0004 0.1657 4.1299 0.7363 
 China – China Development Bank 
Trace 
r=0 r>0 0.0405 16.162 12.321 0.0109 
r≤1 r>1 0.0015 0.5998 4.1299 0.5000 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
r=0 r=1 0.0405 15.562 11.225 0.0082 
r=1 r=2 0.0015 0.5998 4.1299 0.5000 
 Russia – Sberbank 
Trace 
r=0 r>0 0.0731 16.949 12.321 0.0078 
r≤1 r>1 0.0000 0.0006 4.1299 0.9874 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
r=0 r>0 0.0732 16.949 11.225 0.0045 
r≤1 r>1 0.0000 0.0006 4.1299 0.9874 
 Russia - VTB 
Trace 
r=0 r>0 0.0381 16.880 12.321 0.0081 
r≤1 r>1 0.0014 0.6091 4.1299 0.4963 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
r=0 r>0 0.0381 16.271 11.225 0.0060 
r≤1 r>1 0.0014 0.6091 4.1299 0.4963 
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Table 8. Results of cointegration analysis (VEC model estimation output) 
 
Cointegration relations 𝜶𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒈𝒐𝒗 𝜶𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌 𝜷𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒈𝒐𝒗 𝜷𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌 
China – Bank of China -0.0593 
(0.0056) 
-0.0271 
(0.1623) 
1 (0.00) -0.9055 
(0.0157) 
China – CDBC -0.0786 
(0.0301) 
-0.0075 
(0.0289) 
1 (0.00) -0.9044 
(0.0106) 
Russia – Sberbank -0.2339 
(0.1217) 
0.0089 
(0.0952) 
1 (0.00) - 0.9601 
(0.0021) 
Russia – VTB -0.0906 
(0.0261) 
-0.0341 
(0.0216) 
1 (0.00) -0.8735 
(0.0071) 
Note: p-values are denoted in brackets. Significant results are highlighted in bold. 
 
Error-correction terms ∆𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒔𝒐𝒗𝒕 ∆𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒕 
China – Bank of China 
∆𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒔𝒐𝒗𝒕−𝟏 0.0440 (0.4519) 0.1812 (0.0007) 
∆𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒕−𝟏 0.0064 (0.9269) -0.0531 (0.4041) 
𝑫𝒕 (11.04.2003) -0.5923 (0.0000) 0.0348 (0.6716) 
𝑫𝒕 (16.11.2007) 0.5829 (0.0000) 0.6258 (0.0000) 
𝑫𝒕 (24.10.2008) -0.6874 (0.0000) -0.2692 (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.3324 0.1621 
China – China Development Bank 
∆𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒔𝒐𝒗𝒕−𝟏 -0.3083 (0.0585) 0.1954 (0.0561) 
∆𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒕−𝟏 0.2926 (0.0652) -0.0832 (0.0626) 
𝑫𝒕 (24.10.2008) 0.8613 (0.0937) -0.0004 (0.0900) 
𝑫𝒕 (08.05.2009) -0.3886 (0.0927) -0.4600 (0.0890) 
𝑫𝒕 (21.06.2013) 0.0484 (0.0929) 0.4405 (0.0893) 
R-squared 0.3052 0.1747 
Russia – Sberbank   
∆𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒔𝒐𝒗𝒕−𝟏 -0.0217 (0.1501) 0.3231 (0.1174) 
∆𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒕−𝟏 -0.1347 (0.1617) -0.3532 (0.1264) 
𝑫𝒕 (07.05.2010) 0.4393 (0.0813) 0.3985 (0.0636) 
𝑫𝒕 (23.09.2011) 0.3724 (0.0818) 0.3861 (0.0639) 
𝑫𝒕 (14.03.2014) 0.2668 (0.0821) 0.3368 (0.0641) 
R-squared 0.2488 0.3609 
Russia – VTB 
∆𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒔𝒐𝒗𝒕−𝟏 0.1518 (0.0804) 0.2984 (0.0667) 
∆𝒄𝒅𝒔_𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒕−𝟏 -0.2880 (0.0936) -0.3491 (0.0776) 
𝑫𝒕 (14.10.2005) 0.3661 (0.0856) 0.2886 (0.0710) 
𝑫𝒕 (27.07.2007) 0.4872 (0.0852) 0.4684 (0.0706) 
𝑫𝒕 (19.09.2008) 0.3165 (0.0855) 0.4178 (0.0709) 
R-squared 0.2456 0.3024 
Note: p-values are denoted in brackets. Significant results are highlighted in bold. 
 
In order to test short-run linkages between selected stock markets we conduct Granger 
tests for intertemporal causality. Table 9 shows the results of Granger Causality/Block 
Exogeneity Wald tests. It estimates the chi-squared value of coefficient on the lagged 
endogenous variables. The hypothesis in this test is that the lagged endogenous variables do 
not “Granger cause” the dependent variable. Tests of Granger causality indicate that changes 
in sovereign CDS spreads in each case Granger-cause changes in bank CDS spreads at the 1% 
significance level in the observed time period. Such causality supports the theory of 
sovereign-bank risk transmission. More interesting results are obtained for the causality of 
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bank CDS spread changes on sovereign CDS prices. Default risk of the biggest bank in each 
country (namely, Bank of China and Sberbank) does not affect state’s credit default risk. But, 
the fragility of banks, greatly involved in various governmental projects (namely China 
Development Bank and VTB bank), has an impact on the sustainability of public finance.  
 
Table 9. Results of Granger-causality tests 
 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent 
variable 
𝝌𝟐(2) 
statistic 
p-value 
China Bank of China 13.017 0.0015 
China CDBC 28.629 0.0000 
Russia Sberbank 7.9907 0.0184 
Russia VTB 21.067 0.0000 
Bank of China China 1.5201 0.4676 
CDBC China 18.381 0.0001 
Sberbank Russia 1.5998 0.4494 
VTB Russia 14.914 0.0006 
Note: Significant results are highlighted in bold. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
As a result of ever growing interconnectivity in the financial sector, financial stability became 
a public good when its provider cannot exclude any party from its benefits and any party 
should not influence its state. As a result, the interdependence between the financial and 
public sector has started to be one of the major concerns of regulators and policy makers. Our 
main goal was to test this relationship in emerging markets on the example of baking sector of 
China and Russia in the time period from 2003 to 2014. We use sovereign and bank CDS as a 
proxy for modelling default risks.  
 The long-term relationship between sovereign default risk and bank fragility is 
established in four different cases. The stability of such relationship is considerably different 
in two types of cases. The more stable relationship between bank fragility and sovereign 
default risk is found in cases, where biggest state-owned universal banks in emerging 
countries are closely managed by the government. However, the fragility of such banks does 
not directly affect the state of public finance. But, in cases, where state-owned banks directly 
participate in large governmental, usually infrastructure projects, the banking fragility may 
result in deteriorations of state funds, while raising the risk of sovereign default. Therefore, 
the successful completion and return on investments in big infrastructure projects directly 
influences not only the stability of participating banks, but the sovereign default risk as well. 
Any significant changes of sovereign credit risk will significantly affect the banking market in 
China and Russia in a long run. Even if Chinese and Russian public sector are nowadays 
considered to be one of the most stable in the world with low amounts of state debts, the 
problems in banking sector could raise sovereign default risks. As a recent example, when one 
of the Chinese major financial institutions China Credit Trust Co. was in danger of default in 
the beginning of 2014, interbank lending rates started to rise, thus, pressuring sovereign 
default rates. 
Our findings suggest that some country-specific risk factors influence the pricing of 
emerging markets sovereign debt instruments. This contradicts some of the previous findings 
in this area, such as Fender et al. (2012), whose found that the price of sovereign debt in 
emerging market is based on global and regional risk premium, rather than country-specific 
risk factors. 
16 
References 
 
Acharya, V., Drechsler, I., Schnabl, P. 2013. A Pyrrhic victory? Bank bailouts and 
sovereign credit risk. NBER Working Paper Series, No. 17136. 
Alter, A., Schüler, Y.S. 2012. Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks 
during the financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 3444-3468. 
Ammer, J. and Cai, F. 2007. Sovereign CDS and bond dynamics in emerging markets: does 
the cheapest-to-deliver option matter? FED International Finance Discussion Papers, No. 
912. 
Anzoategui, D., Pería, M. and Melecky, M. 2010. Banking sector competition in Russia. 
Policy Research Working Paper, No. 5449. 
Arakelyan, M. and Nestmann, T. 2011. Russia’s quasi-sovereign debt. Deutsche Bank 
Research. Retrieved from: http://www.dbresearch.com/MAIL/DBR_INTERNET_EN-
PROD/PROD0000000000269066.pdf 
Arslanalp and Tsuda (2014). Tracking global demand for emerging market sovereign debt. 
IMF Working Paper, No. 39.  
Asian Development Bank. 2012. Bond Market Guide. Retrieved from: 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2012/asean3-bond-market-guide.pdf 
Berger, A. N., 2007. International Comparisons of Banking Efficiency. Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Instruments, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 119-144. 
BIS. 2011. The impact of sovereign credit risk on bank funding conditions. Committee on the 
Global Financial System Papers, No. 43. 
Bonin, J. P., Hasan, I. and Wachtel, P. 2005. Bank performance, efficiency and ownership 
in transition countries. Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 31–53. 
Bruyckere, V., Gerhardt, M., Schepens, G. and Vennet, R.V. 2013. Bank/sovereign risk 
spillovers in the European debt crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 
4793-4809. 
Maria Cantero-Saiz, M., Sanfilippo-Azofra, S., Torre-Olmo, B. and López-Gutiérrez, C. 
2014. Sovereign risk and the bank lending channel in Europe. Journal of International Money 
and Finance, vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 1-20. 
Carvalho, D. 2014. The real effects of government-owned banks: evidence from an emerging 
market. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 69, No. 2.  
Central Bank of China. 2003. Annual Report 2003, Chapter II. Financial Development. 
Retrieved from: http://www.cbc.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=26964&ctNode=776&mp=2.  
Cornett, M., Guo, L., Khaksari, S. and Tehranian, H. 2010. The impact of state ownership 
on performance differences in privately-owned versus state-owned banks: An international 
comparison. Journal of Financial Intermediation, Vol. 19, No. 1., pp. 74-94. 
Danilova, E. 2012. Fiscal policy, public debt management and government bond markets: 
issues for central banks. BIS Papers, No. 67. 
Demirgüc-Kunt, A. and Huiuinga, H. 2010. Are banks too big to fail or too big to save? 
International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads. CEPR Discussion Papers, No. 
7903. 
Dieckmann, S. and Plank, T. 2011. Default risk of advanced economies: an empirical 
analysis of credit default swaps during the financial crisis. Review of Finance, vol. 6, No. 14, 
pp. 903–934. 
Eichler, S. 2014. The political determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads. Journal of 
International Money and Finance, Forthcoming. 
Ejsing, J. and Lemke, W. 2011.  The Janus-headed salvation: Sovereign and bank credit risk 
premia during 2008–2009. Economics Letters, vol. 110, pp. 28–31. 
17 
Engle, R.F., Granger, C.W. (1987). Co-integration and Error Correction: Representation, 
Estimation and Testing. Econometrica, vol. 55, pp. 251-276. 
Fender, I., Hayo, B., Neunkircher, M. 2012. Daily pricing of emerging market sovereign 
CDS before and during global financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 36, No. 1, 
pp. 2786-2794. 
FSB. 2013. Global shadow banking monitoring report 2013. Financial Stability Board. 
Retrieved from: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_131114.pdf. 
Gonzales-Garcia, J. and Grigoli, F. 2013. State-owned banks and fiscal discipline. IMF 
Working Paper, No. 206. 
Granger, C.W. (1986). Developments in the Study of Cointegrated Economic Variables. 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 3, pp. 213-228. 
Gray, D. F. 2009. Modeling financial crises and sovereign risks. Annual Review of Financial 
Economics, No. 1, pp. 117-144. 
Gray, D. F. and Malone, S.W. 2012. Sovereign and Financial-Sector Risk: Measurement 
and Interactions. Annual Review of Financial Economics, vol. 4, pp. 297-312. 
Jiang, C., Yao, S. and Zhang, Z. 2009. The effects of governance changes on bank 
efficiency in China: A stochastic distance function approach. China Economic Review, Vol. 
20, No. 1, pp. 717–731.  
Johansen, S. (1996). Likelihood-based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Auto-Regressive 
Models, Oxford University Press. 
Juselius, K. (2006). The Cointegrated VAR Model: Methodology and Applications, Oxford 
University Press. 
IMF. 2010. Global Financial Stability Report – sovereigns, funding, and systemic liquidity. 
Washington DC.  
König, P., Anand, K., Heinemann, F. 2014. Guarantees, transparency and the 
interdependency between sovereign and bank default risk. Journal of Banking & Finance, 
Forthcoming. 
Li, J. and Hsu, S. 2013. Shadow banking in China: institutional risk. Political Economy 
Research Instituce Working Paper, No. 334. 
Moody’s, 2009. Moody’s Global Credit Policy Report. Retrieved from: 
https://www.moodys.com/sites/products/DefaultResearch/2007400000573849.pdf 
NSMA. 2010. 1st repo market survey in Russia. Russian Repo Council. Retrieved from: 
http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Market-Info/Repo-Market-Surveys/Russian-
Repo-Surveys/1st%20Russian%20Repo%20survey.pdf 
Paries, M.D., Faia, E. and Palenzuela, D.R. 2012. Bank and sovereign debt risk connection. 
SAFE Working Paper Series, No. 7. 
Sgherri, S., and Zoli, E. 2009. Euro area sovereign risk during the crisis. International 
Monetary Fund, IMF Working Papers, No. 09/222. 
Shen, CH., Hasan, I. and Lin, Ch. 2013. The government’s role in government-owned 
banks. Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper, No. 13.  
Tagkalakis, A. 2014. Financial stability indicators and public debt developments. Bank of 
Greece Working Paper, No. 179. 
Tecles, P. L. and Tabak, B. M. 2010. Determinants of bank efficiency: The case of 
Brazil. European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 207, No. 3, pp. 1587-1598. 
Thomson Reuters Accelus. 2014. Chinese shadow banking: understanding KRIs and risk 
scenarios. Retrieved from: http://accelus.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/GRC00715_ 
0.pdf 
Ye, Y. (2003). The Way of Dealing with Non-performing Loans and Its Effects on Macro-
statistics in China. Retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/npl/eng/2003/ 
051603a.pdf. 
18 
Williams, G., Alsakka, R. and Gwilym, O. 2013. The impact of sovereign ration actions on 
bank ratings in emerging markets. Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 563-
577. 
Zhang, J., Jiang, Ch., Qu, B., Wang, P. 2013. Market concentration risk-taking, and bank 
performance: evidence from emerging economies. International Review of Financial 
Analysis, vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 149-157.  
Zhang, Y. and Barnett, S. 2014. Fiscal vulnerabilities and risks from local government 
finance in China. IMF Working Paper, No. 4. 
  
